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2003 by a Protocol concerning strategic environmental assessment. 10 Leaving aside specific instruments dealing exclusively with this procedure, the obligation to undertake an EIA is contained in several international conventions -among which the Convention on Biological Diversity 11 and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 12 -as well as in the International
Law Commission Draft Articles concerning Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities.
13
In the light of these elements, the obligation to perform an EIA is deemed to have acquired customary nature; however, strong uncertainties persist with regard to its scope and content, as clearly emerges from the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Increasingly faced with cases concerning the protection of the environment and involving the obligation for
States to undertake an EIA, the Court has recognized its customary nature, though appearing uncomfortable with some aspects of its application. On the basis of the analysis of the relevant jurisprudence, it is submitted, in particular, that the principle obliging States to undertake an EIA suffers from a lack of autonomy from other international environmental law principles. This, in turn, implies a set of consequences on its application, among which a problematic crosscontamination between procedural and substantial aspects, which are capable of undermining the effectiveness of EIA itself. the recognition of its customary nature. 19 This article therefore aims to fill this lacuna through the analysis of the jurisprudence of the ICJ, whose case-law is of crucial relevance for the assessment of customary international law. A proper understanding of the content of the obligation to carry out an EIA can be of interest for academics as well as for practitioners, in the first place those involved in the drafting of national legislation, given that, as will be seen, the content of an EIA is still mainly based on national law. In addition to this, the topic can be of direct relevance for those who, at the national and international level, are responsible for the authorisation or funding of projects capable of having a transboundary impact on the environment, as failure to carry out an adequate EIA could be invoked in front of a tribunal as a ground preventing the completion of the project.
The Article is structured as follows: after a short overview of the emergence and consolidation, in the jurisprudence of the Court, of the principle imposing an EIA (section II), the issue of the lack of autonomy will be addressed (section III), and its consequences on the jurisprudence of the Court assessed (section IV). Finally, some suggestions and final remarks will follow (section V).
II. In the case at stake, the applicability of the principle was not raised as an issue, as monitoring obligations were contained in the treaty that formed the basis of the jurisdiction of the Court;
however, the Judge submitted that the obligation to carry out an EIA should be considered as "inbuilt" in any treaty that may reasonably be considered to have a significant impact upon the environment, on the basis of environmental law in its current state of development.
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As mentioned above, the Pulp Mills case 32 was the first time that the principle was explicitly dealt with by the Court. In this case, concerning the construction of two pulp mills on the banks of the Uruguay River, the obligation to perform an EIA was invoked by Argentina, according to which Uruguayan authorities released the authorization to construct the plants without transmitting an adequate EIA.
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In its judgment, the Court fully recognized the customary nature of the obligation to perform an EIA by describing it as "a practice, which in recent years has gained so much acceptance among
States that it may now be considered a requirement under general international law". 34 In the words of the Court, "where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource", an EIA has to be performed.
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of Justice in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case: A Critical Analysis' 9 European Environmental Law Review (2000) 53 According to the definition given by the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the due diligence obligation is an obligation of conduct that aims to ensure the prevention of environmental harm.
Such an obligation consists not only of the adoption of legislative and administrative measures, but also of undertaking diligence and the duty to perform an EIA, especially in relation to the qualification of due diligence as an obligation of conduct or as an obligation of result.
54
Finally, a further aspect of the autonomy of the obligation to conduct an EIA concerns the definition of its content, which in turn is linked to the existence of an international law source that can work as applicable law in the assessment of parties' conduct. In the Pulp Mills case, the Court ruled out the application of the Espoo Convention on the basis of the fact that neither State was party to it, but observed that the UNEP Guidelines, though not binding, had to be taken into account "as guidelines issued by an international technical body". 55 Based on that, the Court established that: "it is for each State to determine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization process for the project, the specific content of the environmental impact assessment required in each case, having regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the environment as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment."
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Such an approach is confirmed in the Certain activities and Construction of a Road cases, whereas no mention is made of international instruments.
efforts to ensure that private operators comply with these norms (Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, 1 February 2011, at paras. 110-111)
. 54 The uncertainties relating to the definition of the obligation of due diligence clearly emerge in the separate opinions attached to the Certain Activities and Construction of a Road cases. According to Judge ad hoc Dugard, the duty of due diligence is a standard of conduct required to implement the principle of prevention, which, in turn, is implemented though a number of specific, independent obligations, which include the duty to carry out an EIA (Certain activities, supra, note 36, Separate opinion of Judge Dugard, at paras. 7-9). The autonomy of the obligation to undertake an EIA is instead opposed by Judge Owada, who states this obligation is one element in the "holistic process" that emanates from the obligation of States to use due diligence to avoid environmental harm, "rather than a separate and independent obligation standing on its own under general international law" (Ibid., Separate opinion of Judge Owada, at para. 18). In the same sense, see also the opinion of Judge Donoghue, which defines due diligence as the "governing primary norm" (Ibid., Separate opinion of Judge Donoghue, at para. 9). As has been underlined, Art If, therefore, this jurisprudence seems to confirm the non-autonomous character of the principle, the analysis of the impact of such an approach on the reasoning of the Court constitutes a further, interesting step.
IV. The Lack of Autonomy of the Principle and its Impact on the Reasoning of the Court
If, as illustrated above, the performance of an EIA is generally deemed to bring about environmental benefits, an autonomous application of the corresponding normative principle -the obligation to perform an EIA -is of the essence. What it is argued, therefore, is that the lack of autonomy, far from being a mere formal aspect of the legal reasoning, can impact on the effectiveness of the principle and jeopardise its benefits.
A first, relevant consequence of the lack of autonomy of the obligation to undertake an EIA is related to the distinction between procedural and substantive obligations. As has been shown, the obligation to perform an EIA, being an instrumental one, does not qualify as procedural or substantive per se. This determines a certain contamination, in the reasoning of the Court, between these two dimensions and, more precisely, the fact that compliance with what is ultimately a procedure might become dependent on factual aspects. It is submitted that this could undermine the very rationale of EIA, i.e. the identification of future environmental harm, to the extent that the presence of harm, instead of being the outcome of the process, becomes one of its constitutive elements. This, in turn, could undermine some of the main advantages associated to EIA, such as the improvement of the design of the project and the choice of more environmentally sound options.
The problems stemming from establishing a link between the performance of an EIA and substantial aspects have been underlined by Judge Dugard, who argued that the "danger" of viewing the due diligence obligation as the source of the obligation to perform an EIA is that it allows a State to argue, retrospectively, that because no harm has been proved at the time of the legal proceedings, no duty of due diligence arose. 58 According to the Judge, such a "backward looking approach" was applied in the Certain activities case, where the Court confirmed the findingalready contained in the study carried out by Nicaragua in 2006 -that the dredging programme would have no impact on the river environment, which, in turn, allowed it to state that Nicaragua was not required to carry out an EIA.
59
58 Ibid., at para.10.
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The mixing of procedural and substantive issues can be seen, first of all, in the Pulp Mills case.
Here the analysis of the compliance -in the broader framework of the violation of substantive obligations -with the duty to carry out an EIA in relation to the choice of the site of the mill is split in two further questions: whether Uruguay failed to act with due diligence in conducting the EIAparticularly with respect to the choice of the location -and whether the location chosen was actually unsuitable or could damage the environment of the river. 60 Whereas the first point is assessed by taking into account the methodology followed (in particular, the consideration of alternative sites), 61 as regards the second issue the Court focuses its analysis on substantial aspects, i.e. the capacity of the waters of the river to receive, dilute and disperse discharges of effluent from the plant. 62 The reasoning of the Court is therefore logically flawed to the extent that it is based on the correct performance of the procedure and, at the same time, on the outcome that such a procedure should have brought about.
The same applies to the Road in Costa Rica and Certain activities cases because of the fact that, as established by the Court, the obligation to undertake an EIA only arises once a preliminary assessment 63 of the existence of a risk has been carried out. Once again, the performance of an EIA is made contingent upon an element -the existence of risk -which should be the result of EIA itself. In addition to this, the application of a probabilistic logic inherent in any risk assessment clashes with the very nature of EIA, which tends to be conceived as a quasi-automatic procedure. In any case, it would be hard to establish which threshold of risk is the one applied in the context of the preliminary assessment and which one in the context of the EIA. 64 These thresholds, in turn, do not correspond to the one applied to ascertain risk after the activity has taken place.
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60 Pulp Mills, supra note 32, at para. 209. 61 Ibid., at para. 210. 62 Ibid., at para. 211.
63 Certain activities, supra note 36, at para. 154. 64 It is interesting to note how a similar problem arose in relation to the application of Art. 5.7 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS measures) (allowing Members to adopt a precautionary approach, and therefore to adopt trade-restrictive measures in the absence of scientific certainty) and the general obligation to ensure that SPS measures are based on a risk assessment contained in Art. 5.1 of the Agreement. In an attempt to clarify the relationship between the two provisions, the Appellate Body has affirmed that "Article 5.7 is concerned with situations where deficiencies in the body of scientific evidence do not allow a WTO Member to arrive at a sufficiently objective conclusion in relation to risk" and that the same provision, Art. 5.7, "contemplates situations where there is some evidentiary basis indicating the possible existence of a risk, but not enough to permit the performance of a risk its relationship with the obligation to notify and to consult the other party. Whereas in the Pulp Mills case the EIA is ancillary to the obligation to notify, in the other cases the relationship is inverted as, according to the Court, such an obligation arises once the EIA has been carried out.
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Such an approach raises some perplexities; first of all because it is not consistent with the most frequent formulations of the principle of consultation and notification, which consider it as a selfstanding obligation. 67 As observed by Judge Donoghue, States' practice does not justify such a formulation, as due diligence may call for notification at a different stage in the process, e.g. before the EIA has taken place. 68 Moreover, from a practical point of view, the benefits in terms of transparency and public participation that generally stem from EIA would be reduced if the obligation to perform the EIA was only triggered when an obligation to notify exists, as this obligation does not always apply. On the other side, the opposite relationship would give rise to a paradoxical effect to the extent that failure to comply with the obligation to perform an EIA would exempt the defendant from the obligation to notify. The jurisprudence analysed above enables us to make some remarks about the way the obligation to perform an EIA has been applied so far by the ICJ and, more precisely, about its independent status as a principle of international environmental law.
As was underlined at the outset, the jurisprudence of the Court leaves no doubt as to the customary status of the principle. On the other hand, the obligation to perform an EIA struggles to find a definite shape, both in relation to other customary principles of public international law and in relation to existing treaty law.
With respect to the first aspect, it has been remarked how the Court tends to consider the obligation to perform an EIA in conjunction with other environmental obligations. It is here submitted that, to achieve greater effectiveness in the ultimate aim of these principles (the protection of the environment), a decoupling would be recommendable. In the first place, the obligation to perform an EIA should be applied independently from due diligence and prevention obligations, not only as the definitions of these obligations are (especially the first one) not completely clear, but also to avoid a "backward looking approach". As illustrated above, such an approach allows a determination that, where it is demonstrated that the activity does not pose any risk, the EIA is deemed to be not necessary. Likewise, the obligation to perform an EIA should also be assessed independently from the notification obligation; even if, in practical terms, the EIA often forms part of the documents that have to be notified to the other party, a separate application would allow the judge to hold the State responsible for two distinct breaches. This could be particularly useful in those circumstances (as the Pulp Mills case) where applicable treaty provisions are specific on notification obligations but more vague in relation to the performance of an EIA.
This leads us to the last point, i.e. the content of the EIA and the existence of a customary norm that, regardless of applicable treaty provisions (e.g. the Espoo Convention), can identify a noyeau dur of information the EIA has to contain. In relation to this point, in his separate opinion, Judge
Bhandari posited that, despite its regional nature, the Espoo Convention could be used as a "standard that nation States should strive towards". 75 Based on this idea, he suggested what he deemed could constitute a "lowest common denominator" 76 while conducting an EIA, including e.g. a description of the activity and of potential alternatives. Though fascinating such an idea may be, it is the opinion of the author that such a detailed approach is incompatible with the general nature of obligations that characterize customary norms and, in any case, with the current practice and opinio juris of States. It is, therefore, submitted that, at the current stage of development of international law, the content of an EIA cannot but be determined by the international treaties that States are party to, which, in turn, will impact on their domestic law. This is why the adoption of soft law instruments (such as the UNEP Principles), as well as the ratification of the Espoo Convention, will be of the essence for the advancement of the practice to undertake an EIA.
